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Firms, Governance and Development in Industrial Districts 
March 2017 
Abstract 
This paper explores the link between local governance structures and the ability of local firms 
to influence the strategic direction (and future development) of their industrial district. In doing 
so we utilise unique survey data from two British industrial districts to first examine the extent 
to which local firms shape local industrial development strategies, and secondly the 
institutional conduits through which their influence is exercised.  The empirical results suggest 
a role for (local) business associations, the building of reciprocal networks among firms, social 
capital, and more heterarchical governance structures to enhance firm engagement in local 
initiatives and industrial development.  
Keywords: local governance, industrial districts, development, business associations, 
networks, social capital, UK, ceramics, jewellery. 
JEL Codes: D7, L2, L6, R11
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1. Introduction 
There is on-going interest in the notion of resilience and the ability of (old) industrial districts 
to revitalise themselves (Bailey and Turok, 2016). Yet within this and indeed the wider 
literature on local economic development, a critical but in recent times somewhat neglected 
issue is the concept of governance in local production systems.  Where governance is addressed 
in relation to local economic development it has tended to focus on territorial governance by 
government and government agencies (Pike at al. 2016; Bailey and Berkeley, 2014).   
It has been claimed a wider conceptualisation of local governance is enhanced by promoting 
what Cooke and Morgan (1998) once termed associational economies, where local 
institutions, social capital, and strong (local) business networks play a prominent role and make 
a significant contribution to development (Aragón et al., 2014).  Whilst such claims are partly 
based upon research into the experiences of Italian industrial districts, there is a paucity of 
(wider) quantitative work exploring the extent to which these claims have merit, both in general 
terms, and also if distinct facets of governance are of particular importance.  For instance, De 
Propris and Wei (2007) highlight the ability of (local) firms to shape the strategic direction of 
their industry, which makes them a potentially crucial aspect of a local governance system that 
has yet to be explored.  Firms are at the core of local economic activity and have an inherent 
interest in local industry development issues, especially: the development of local 
infrastructure; (locally based) publicly funded business support services (including public 
R&D facilities and technology); the use of urban space; marketing and (industrial) tourism; 
and in specific industrial districts, co-ordinating industry wide strategy. Resolution of these 
issues are matters of local governance, and crucially, shape a localitys industrial development 
path.   
The contribution of this paper is two-fold. First, the paper makes a theoretical contribution by 
explicitly exploring the link between local governance and the ability of local firms to influence 
the strategic direction (and future development) of their industrial district. We then present a 
novel, formal model which captures the various institutional conduits through which this 
influence is exercised. Secondly, this model is then estimated by an ordinal regression 
technique using unique survey data from an administered survey of firms in two traditional 
Marshallian industrial districts based in the British Midlands: the North Staffordshire 
Ceramics industry, in Stoke-on-Trent; and the Birmingham Jewellery Quarter in Hockley, 
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Birmingham1. In doing so, we also highlight the extent to which local firms in these districts 
shape local industrial development strategies. Industrial districts are interesting candidates for 
analysing local governance processes, since the interests of industry and the wider region are 
often entwined regarding socio-economic development. Our study not only provides a new 
quantitative insight, but the distinctive British context also offers an original (and different) 
perspective from earlier (qualitative) narratives on local governance structures which have a 
largely Italian focus (e.g Beccattini, 1990).  Moreover, both of our chosen industrial districts 
have until recently, struggled to meet the challenges posed by globalisation, with weak local 
governance structures - characterised by low levels of engagement by (local) firms in district 
wide initiatives and in the broader strategic direction of the districts - previously having being 
identified as a hindrance to future development (De Propris and Wei, 2007; Hervas-Oliver et 
al., 2011).   
The UK context is also timely since in recent years the UK government have sought to promote 
a localism agenda, with a greater emphasis being placed upon private sector actors engaging 
in local governance and managing local economic development (Bentley and Pugalis, 2013).  
UK business communities have been encouraged to become more active in this regard as it has 
been noted that historically  compared to their European counterparts -  a degree of apathy 
existed among (local) UK business towards local governance (Heseltine, 2012; Raco, 2003).  
This agenda is often juxtaposed within the wider context of rebalancing the UK economy, 
especially in relation to revitalising lagging manufacturing regions where decentralisation is 
now seen as part of the solution (Bailey et.al, 2016).  Yet, it remains unclear as to the extent to 
which local UK firms actively influence and shape local development initiatives.  
The remainder of this paper is set out as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature, exploring the 
links between local governance structures and local development, and the spheres of firm 
influence; namely business associations, local networks and social capital. Section 3 introduces 
both case studies. Section 4 describes the data and methodological approach. Section 5 presents 
and discusses the results, while Section 6 concludes.     
1 Both districts were identified by Marshall (1919) as exhibiting the properties of a traditional industrial district, 
namely being largely propagated by a population of small and medium sized firms, (relatively) high levels of 
vertical and horizontal specialisation of skills and the existence of an industrial atmosphere (De Propris and 
Lazzeretti, 2007; Tomlinson and Jackson, 2013). The governance of industrial districts was taken up much later 
by scholars in the Italian tradition (Brusco, 1982; Beccattini, 1990).
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2. Conceptual Issues 
2.1 Governance, Associational Economies and Organic Leadership  
In exploring the ability of firms to shape local development strategies, it is first helpful to 
clarify the concept of (local) governance. Le Gales and Voelzkow (2001, pp. 68) provide a 
broad perspective, defining governance in terms of the institutions which coordinate or 
regulate action or transactions among subjects within a system, before identifying institutions 
such as markets, firms, business associations, networks, trade unions, the state, and the wider 
community as being the main components of a typical governance system.  It is the inter-play 
between these various constituents which shape local development.   
Considering broad conceptualisations of governance has long been integral to explorations of 
European industrial districts, particularly in the oft celebrated districts in Baden-Württemberg 
and Emilia-Romagna (Brusco, 1990; Beccattini, 1990). Cooke and Morgan (1998) labelled 
these associational economies due to the high degree of embeddedness among (local) actors, 
exemplified in close network ties with strong social capital among actors2 and recognised 
institutions (including laws, regulations, and social norms). While these characteristics 
typically bind a locality together, in local production systems (such as industrial districts) it is 
the agglomeration of firms and appropriate institutional supports which can provide the basis 
for what Bailey et.al (2010) describe as organic forms of place-renewing leadership. This 
organic leadership arises through the emergence of joint actions, closer collaboration, and 
engagement between local actors on local and industry issues (and initiatives) such as industry 
regulations, training and skills, access to finance, district marketing, new technologies, and 
production operations. Such collective actions in turn enable local firms (and other 
stakeholders) to jointly identify (and address) new challenges and issues of mutual concern, 
and thus participate in strategic-decisions which affect the districts future trajectory. Thus, the 
foundation of the historical success of some Italian districts in moving into higher value added 
markets, new domains, and onto new trajectories, was a relatively pluralistic (local) governance 
in which no one firm was dominant. This ensued both social and economic development moved 
together in an integrated and inclusive process (Dei Ottati, 2003; Beccattini, 1990).  
2 Social capital is a collective social resource, arising from (and shaped by) networked actors, creating value for 
network members e.g. through knowledge sharing and collaboration (Payne et al., 2011).  
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2.2 Business Associations, collective action, and local development 
Given our focus on the role and influence of firms in shaping local development, one of the 
main fulcrums of the governance of associational economies and conduits for firms to exert 
policy influence - over (local) industry issues - are a localitys set of business associations (and 
the networks inherent to them) (Bennett, 1998). In industrial districts these include not only 
local Chambers of Commerce, but also industry trade associations, district R&D centres and, 
in a looser sense, informal industry forums. These local associations provide member firms 
exclusive access to a set of collective services including public R&D facilities, legal and 
financial advice, marketing, and all typically at a lower cost due to staff expertise, economies 
of scale, and lower transaction costs than alternative market providers (Bennett, 2011). This 
exclusivity of services - which Bennett (1998) refers to as the logic of services - generally 
subsidises the representative function (the logic of influence), thus allowing (local) 
associations to represent (local) industry interests on policy-related issues affecting (local) 
industrial development.  
Indeed, the representative function provides industrial localities with credibility and socio-
political legitimacy in the public domain. Such legitimacy enhances industry/locality lobbying 
with state (and other) interlocutors and may allow (local) business associations to inform and 
shape legislation (and regulation) at local, national, and supra-national levels (Bennett, 1998). 
For example, and relevant to one of the case studies considered herein (see Section 3), the 
British Ceramics Confederation (BCC) - based in Stoke-on-Trent - recently worked closely 
with local firms, Parliamentarians, and others to successfully lobby the British government to 
exclude the ceramics industry from the Climate Change Levy (a business tax on energy use). 
This has been a significant factor in improving the competitiveness of the ceramics district 
(Tomlinson and Branston, 2014).  
Given the role of local business associations in district governance, key questions arise as to 
how such organisations are able to deal with their inherent collective action problems such as 
whose interests are represented, and which member firms are involved in (and influence) socio-
political processes. At the local level, member firms themselves are either passive or active 
participants in a business associations (socio-political) activities, with a firms decision to 
participate reflecting the balance between gaining influence (and prestige) within industry 
circles against the time, staffing, and financial commitments they are prepared to offer in 
support of collective action and the associated temptation to free-ride. In this regard, and with 
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their greater resources and wider public visibility, larger district firms may take the active lead 
in (local) business associations and assume collective responsibility for representing local 
industry interests. On issues of mutual concern and where there is already wide consensus, 
resource-constrained smaller firms may reap the spill-over benefits of such representation 
(Tomlinson, 2012)3. 
Firm participation also very much depends upon the nature of governance within (local) 
business associations and their effectiveness in achieving positive outcomes for the industry. 
Contradictory tensions may arise where (local) business associations seek to be inclusive and 
representative of a broad and diverse membership base (the logic of membership) while also 
trying to formulate a clear and coherent position on matters of negotiation with policymakers. 
If governance structures adhere too closely to the logic of membership, business associations 
may become less effective in wider policy circles as the associations ability to articulate a 
consistent collective voice (among disparate actors) is compromised. In such cases, some firms 
may withdraw/becoming less active and less influential in local business association activities 
(Bennett, 1998). On the other hand, within associational economies an open and inclusive 
format may be attractive to firms, thus raising the level of active membership of business 
associations.  
H1: District firms which are active members (vis-à-vis passive or non-members) of local 
business associations are more likely to influence local industry issues and initiatives
2.3 Network Governance and local development
Business Associations are, of course, only part of the much wider network of actors in industrial 
districts.  Indeed, local network governance, specifically the extent and nature of (local) 
relationships among co-ordinated networks of firms - engaged in interdependent production 
(and distribution) activities - is now regarded as especially important in shaping local 
development (Dei Ottati, 2003; Aragón et al., 2014). For instance, in the Italian districts, local 
networks were typically regarded as exhibiting largely heterarchical (i.e. flat or diffuse) 
governance as they were based upon a series of ongoing (mainly horizontal) socio-economic 
relations among relatively equal participants who exhibited mutual interdependencies in 
production, co-operation, and embodied by shared resources, trust, and reciprocity.  With 
3 Where business associations become overly dependent upon the resources of larger firms, the latter will shape 
the agenda to pursue largely their own interests. If small firms interests are not represented or severely 
compromised, they may refrain from participating in locally led initiatives, as occurred in South East Turkey 
(Bayirbag, 2011). 
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economic power relatively diffuse, a wide set of actors were able to participate and deliberate 
over local industry development processes. In contrast, more hierarchical (local) networks are 
dominated by a few core actors, who are able to exert their own economic strength to gear local 
development paths to suit their own strategic aims, often with little wider consultation 
(Sacchetti and Sugden, 2003)4.   
Thus the degree to which (local) firms shape local development is embedded within the nature 
of (local) dyads (i.e. relationships between (industry) participants). In this regard, highly 
networked (local) firms are more likely to hold greater sway over (local) industry issues, since 
they are more proactive and prominent across industry networks. This allows them to exercise 
their voice across a wider set of industry forums (and issues) and hence play a leading role in 
co-ordinating initiatives.  
H2: Highly networked district firms are more likely to influence local industry issues and 
initiatives 
Related to this is recognition that wider (local) networking facilitates greater participation, 
engagement and interaction among firms in local production processes. As noted, within more 
heterarchical local governance structures there is possibly more scope for concertation, 
deliberation and mediation among networked firms on issues of mutual concern. These issues 
include not only the ongoing management of shared resources and social assets, but also in 
dealing with industry crises (such as dealing with external shocks) and formulating long term 
objectives for the districts development (Dei Ottati, 2003). Indeed, wide deliberation among 
district firms may (or may not) lead to consensus around a collective strategy and the 
emergence of a shared vision or identity for the industrial locality. Where firms exercise their 
own voice in formulating district strategy, they are more likely to exert influence (Bianchi and 
Labory, 2011).  
H3: The more district firms share a vision or believe in collective goals in the locality, the 
more likely they are to influence local industry issues and initiatives. 
4 In some cases, the localitys trajectory may become locked in to serving the technological requirements of 
monopolistic firms, increasing the localitys vulnerability to external shocks (Bailey et.al, 2015).  
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2.4 Firm engagement in local initiatives 
The general proposition is within industrial districts and specifically those districts with the 
characteristics of associational economies, there are greater opportunities for firms and other 
stakeholders to play a role in shaping local trajectories (Cooke and Morgan, 1998; Beccattini, 
1990).  Nevertheless, for firms to exert their wider influence over local development, they are 
also most likely to be active in local policy circles and initiatives.  As De Propris and Wei 
(2007) note, only if actors (such as firms) are willing and able to participate in local issues and 
initiatives, can their interests be reflected in the collective decision-making processes and hence 
shape the direction of the development of the locality.   
H4: District firms which express interest and participate in local initiatives are more likely to 
influence local industrial development.
3. Contextual Background
Our research is set in the context of two mature UK industrial districts.  The first is the North 
Staffordshire Ceramics industrial district based in and around the city of Stoke-on-Trent. The 
district is the centre of the UK ceramics industry, including the production of various types of 
ceramics products, and related material and equipment suppliers.  Crucially given the focus on 
(local) governance, the district is also home to the industrys main trade associations (British 
Ceramic Confederation (BCC), British Ceramic Plant and Machinery Manufacturer 
Association (BCPMMA), International Clay Technology Association (ICTa)), ceramic 
research centres (Lucid-eon, Ceramic Skills Academy) and the industrys trade union (Unity).  
During the late twentieth century, the district entered a long decline (1979-2008) as firms 
struggled to adapt to the challenges posed by globalisation and other exogenous shocks. The 
result was the closure of several high profile factories (and firms) and moves by some 
manufacturers to outsource production and/or set up production facilities in the Far East to 
take advantage of lower labour costs.  Hervas-Oliver et al., (2011) attribute many of these 
difficulties to period of weak local governance, with the long decline coinciding with the 
strategic decisions of larger firms (on factors such as investment, employment and output 
which affect the whole district) being increasingly taken by external (and hierarchical) 
corporate and institutional shareholders, who notably adopted a more short-term focus.  Since 
2008, there have been signs of a potential renaissance in the fortunes of the district, in part due 
to improvements in district governance driven by better collective action by firms and wider 
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fora for (smaller) firms to participate in industry development issues (Tomlinson and Branston, 
2014). 
The second district is the Birmingham Jewellery Quarter (BJQ), a cluster of jewellery firms 
and allied trades in the Hockley area of Birmingham. As in Stoke-on-Trent, the BJQ has been 
established for several hundred years but has faced a decline in recent decades, again due to 
globalisation and competition from cheap imports.  More recently, the BJQ has faced pressures 
over the use of urban space, with more housing development and increasing demands from 
developers to transform rented workshops into residential use. Underlying these challenges is 
the BJQ has also been blighted by weak governance.  De Propris and Wei (2007), for instance, 
examined the history of the district and explored its (then) current governance, concluding that 
firms rarely have an input in important decisions about the BJQ and that very few collective 
actions are observed now (p.2483).  The implication is there was a lack of district wide 
collective decision-making.  Nevertheless, the BJQ still includes a large number of jewellery 
related firms and importantly for the study herein, is also home to various industry bodies, 
including the main union (The British Jewellers Association), the Birmingham School for 
Jewellery, the Birmingham Assay office, the Jewellery Quarter Association (JQA), and the 
BJQ Development Trust (JQDT) (see De Propris and Lazzeretti (2009)).   
Despite previous studies highlighting weak governance structures in both districts, preliminary 
discussions with representatives from both the main institutions (the BCC in Stoke-on-Trent 
and the JQDT in Birmingham) and several (randomly selected) firms in each district outlined 
the various activities which district firms could participate in and hence influence local 
industrial development. These are documented in Table (1) and include the (collective) 
development of skills/training, technology, marketing, and wider industry issues.       
INSERT TABLE (1) HERE 
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4. Methodology  
4.1 Sampling Frame and Survey Design  
The data for the study data is collated from a survey of firms in both districts. The survey was 
administered by post  with an option to complete online  during a four month period in 
2013/14.  Questionnaires addressed to the Managing Director of each firm and were sent to all 
282 ceramics firms in the Stoke-on-Trent district and all 138 jewellery firms registered in the 
Birmingham jewellery quarter (BJQ) as at 1st May. Questions related to the previous five years 
of business trading and explored local governance structures, firms participation in 
development initiatives, firms networking activities and social capital, along with acquiring 
background information on each firm. In both districts, we took advice from industry 
representatives on the framing of particular questions to suit local nuances.  
In Stoke-on-Trent, a total of 121 responses (42.9% response rate) were received, with 112 
(39.7%) providing complete information, while in the BJQ there were 68 (49.3%) responses, 
with 63 (45.6%) firms providing complete information for the current study. These are highly 
respectable response rates for survey research (Hair, et al., 2007). Tests for non-response bias 
were based upon comparing the mean responses of the variables under consideration of the 
early and late respondents, with ANOVA analysis revealing no significant differences 
(Armstrong and Overton, 1977).  
4.2 Model, Variable Construction and Descriptive Statistics
Following the discussion in Section 2, we seek to explore a firms degree of influence on local 
development processes and the factors determining this influence. More formally,   
n 
Degree of Influence = β0 + β1 Age + β2 Size + β3 District + β4 ∑ Xik  + εi            (1). 
                                                                                                                                                    i=1  
where Xi is a vector of independent variables and considered as having a positive impact upon 
a firms degree of influence in the districts decision-making processes. Firm Age, size and a 
dummy variable capturing district affiliation act as control variables. The primary variables of 
interest are briefly described below (full details in Appendix A).  
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4.2.1 Dependent Variable 
Degree of Influence: Firms were asked the extent to which they had influenced the districts 
strategic direction with respect to district wide policy initiatives (as indicated by the issues set 
out in Table 1) over the previous five years. The measure is discrete, utilising a 7 point Likert 
scale, where 1 equates to no influence/non-involvement and 7 a very high level of influence 
in district initiatives.   
It is worth deliberating further on the distribution of responses in relation to the dependent 
variable, which is captured in Figure (1) for the overall sample and each district.5  Both 
distributions largely mirror one another, with the majority of firms perceiving they have had 
no or little influence on district wide decision-making.  Indeed, few firms appear to believe 
they hold significant sway in district wide issues with only 8% of all firms in the sample in the 
top two categories (6 and 7), while 57.1% are in the bottom two categories (1 and 2).   In respect 
to the latter, both categories cover those firms that had no involvement with the difference 
being those in the first category report no interest in such activities, whilst those in the second 
category report no involvement due to not being approached (in some way). Therefore, the 
20% of firms in the first category can be considered to be a raw measure of the degree of apathy 
(over local development) within each district given they have reported no interest.     
This result is perhaps not too surprising given historical attitudes of apathy (by local firms) 
towards governance in both districts. De Propris and Weis (2007) study found low 
participation in local (residential and commercial) policy issues, and suggested this was due to 
firms holding perceptions their involvement was not important and/or unlikely to have any 
influence. This (local) apathy was reinforced by industry wide-policy issues (e.g. regulation) 
largely being made at European Union level, while many area decisions were taken by property 
developers and the City Council with little (perceived) local consultation. As noted, in Stoke- 
on-Trent, similar issues have also long been observed with regards to participating in district 
governance (Hervas-Oliver et al., 2011).6
5 Appendix B shows the level of survey responses as distributed by size for both the dependent variable and the 
categorical independent variables. Smaller firms were generally more active business association members and 
participated more in development initiatives suggesting business association membership in some way 
compensates for firm size.  
6 The extent of apathy is also unsurprising given the majority of (surveyed) firms  in both districts - are relatively 
small (see Appendix B), and participating in district wide policy forums is very costly in terms of both time and 
resources.  
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INSERT FIGURE (1) HERE 
4.2.2 Independent Variables. 
Business Association Membership: This is a categorical variable (1-3), distinguishing 
between firms identifying themselves as active members of a local business association (e.g a 
trade association and/or the Chamber of Commerce), those who identified as merely being 
members, and a base category for those who identified as non-members. Across both districts, 
the survey data revealed 37.1% were active members of at least one business association, a 
further 40% were registered members (of at least one association) while the remaining 22.9% 
held no association memberships.   
Support from Business Institutions: This is a construct variable capturing the extent to which 
district firms indicated receiving support and advice from (and utilising the facilities of) local 
business institutions.  The rationale is firms accessing such support are more likely to become 
involved in and/or influence in local initiatives.  
Participation in Development Initiatives: This is a categorical variable (1-3), capturing the 
extent to which firms indicated being encouraged (by for example, trade associations, local 
government or other firms) to participate in local development initiatives. Firms more actively 
engaged in such initiatives are more likely to have an influence on district strategy.  
Interest in District Development Initiatives:  This is a categorical variable (1-3), capturing 
the extent to which firms expressed an interest in district development initiatives.  
District Ties: This is a categorical variable (1-3) capturing the extent to which firms identified 
as being networked within the district. In associational economies, highly networked firms 
(within the district) are more likely to influence district strategy.     
Shared Values: This is a construct variable capturing the shared values within the district. 
Where firms hold similar values they are more likely to form consensus and exert greater 
influence over district strategy.  
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4.3 Operationalisation of Variables and data validation  
For the construct variables Cronbach’s alpha (α) was calculated to test for convergent validity, 
which exceeded the accepted minimum of 0.7 in all cases, thereby satisfying the criteria for 
internal consistency and reliability. In addition, the variance-extracted estimates for these 
constructs were compared with the square of their respective correlation coefficient thus 
satisfying discriminant validity.  Face validity was satisfied by utilising previously used multi-
scale items (Hair et al., 2007).  
Despite following well-established methodological precedents in dealing with survey data, 
such data may suffer from an over-reliance upon managerial retrospective recall, sense-making, 
and common methods bias.  To militate against this, we followed Rong and Wilkinson (2011) 
by testing for the validity of subjective assessments of single responses to the survey questions. 
This involved gathering similar independent data on the key variables from a randomly selected 
sample of 40 senior managers from surveyed firms across both districts. These responses were 
gathered by telephone, and this additional control was run for the dependent and key 
independent variables.  We found no evidence of bias in the data and conclude the validity of 
subjective assessments was acceptable. In addition, we also reversed several items in the 
survey, while also placing questions relating to the dependent and independent variables into 
separate sections of the survey to mitigate the possibility of respondents linking the categories 
(Podsakoff et al., 2003). All respondents were assured anonymity to elicit truthful responses. 
As a final test, a Harman single-factor test was conducted in which all measures (in the study) 
were loaded into an exploratory factor analysis, with the result the largest factor accounted for 
only 28.6 % of the variance, which is within the bounds of acceptability (Hair.et al., 2007). It 
is thus unlikely common methods bias is a problem in the data.  
5.0 Estimation and Results
Since the dependent variable is discrete and scaler with the higher values clearly indicating 
firms have greater influence over district strategy, Equation (1) is an Ordered Probit model 
(Wooldridge, 2010). The model is estimated in Stata v14 using Maximum Likelihood 
techniques, first by including the control variables and then sequentially, the independent 
variables. The results are reported in Tables 2 and 3, with the estimated  values reflecting the 
relative importance of each variable in each estimation.   
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INSERT Tables (2) and (3) HERE 
Overall, the models perform well.  Both the pseudo R squared measures  the Nagelkerke, and 
Cox and Snell statistics  improve with the inclusion of additional explanatory variables. In 
terms of the control variables, the estimated results (Table 2) indicate no significant differences 
in a firms degree of influence between the two districts, while firm age is insignificant. Firm 
size is significant indicating larger firms appear to have a greater influence over district 
decision-making (Table 2, Col 1). However, this effect diminishes (becoming insignificant) as 
other explanatory variables are added to the model, suggesting other factors may compensate 
for firm size.  
We now turn to the primary variables of interest included in estimations (2) to (4) in Table (2). 
First, it appears that while membership of a local business association provides a channel for 
firms to influence decision-making (Column 2), this effect becomes insignificant in the later 
estimations. However, there is significant evidence (across all estimations) to suggest those 
firms which are active members of such organisations (i.e. those members which take a 
prominent role in committees, meetings and association initiatives) are more likely to exert a 
degree of influence over district wide-policy initiatives (Columns 2-4). Thus H1 is supported. 
Moreover, firms which receive support, advice, and use the services of local business 
institutions are also significantly more likely to have a greater degree of influence (Column 3).  
Both measures directly capturing social capital are significant, suggesting support for both H2 
and H3. Across both districts, where firms are highly networked (H2) they are more prominent 
within (local) industry circles and are able to shape opinion and influence decision-making. 
Similarly, district firms which are more active in deliberating with others over industry wide 
issues exert more influence in formulating local (industry) consensus (H3). Finally, district 
firms which express a frequent (and even occasional) interest in/engage with and actively 
participate in district wide initiatives are also significantly more likely to influence local 
development (H4 supported; see Columns 3 and 4).  
Table (3) reports the results exploring the importance of actual participation in specific district 
wide initiatives. Again, the estimations confirm the significance of active business association 
membership and social capital (shared values). The results infer that firms which have medium 
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or high level participation in district wide collective marketing (Columns 1 and 2), tourism 
initiatives (Column 3), and local infrastructure (Column 4) are also significantly more likely to 
exert an influential voice in local decision-making. In addition, this inference is also true for 
those firms with a high degree of participation in district wide development and operation of 
R&D facilities and training (Column 2).  For completeness, the marginal effects are reported 
for both sets of results in Appendix C.  
5.1 Wider Discussion  
Overall, where firms seek to influence the strategic direction of their industrial district, the 
results confirm the importance of networking and active participation in the associational 
aspects of the local economy. For instance, whereas membership of a local business association 
provides an opportunity to engage with other actors, it is active members of such organisations 
- those members which take a prominent role in committees and meetings - which are able to 
exert a significant influence over district wide-policy initiatives. This is also the case where 
firms are actively engaged in local business networks, reciprocal relationships, and participate 
in district initiatives. Indeed, our estimations imply these activities may compensate for firm 
size (which becomes insignificant as other variables are added; see Table (1)), and act as 
conduits through which smaller firms can exert greater influence in strategic decision-making 
over local (industry) development. Through engagement in such activities, firms may form a 
consensus and/or a shared vision for the district, which in turn, is also more likely to influence 
district strategy.       
As noted in Section (2.1), these traits have long been a purported feature of governance 
processes in the Italian districts, where local firms and other stakeholders often work in 
conjunction with municipalities over regional development. This type of local democratic 
engagement has generally been less prevalent in the UK, although the recent trend towards 
devolution has begun to emphasise it is local actors, especially firms, which are in a better 
position to shape local socio-economic trajectories (Heseltine, 2012; Bailey et al., 2016). In 
the context of reviving older industrial districts, this is particularly relevant where (through 
collective actions) organic place renewing leadership can emerge to help shape, renew and 
transform manufacturing activities, thus enabling districts to avoid the risks of technological 
lock-ins and assist (local) industry in meeting the challenges posed by globalisation (see 
Section 2.1; Bailey et.al 2010).   
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Returning to our cases and in North Staffordshire, new forms of organic place renewing 
leadership and governance have begun to emerge via groups such as the Ceramic Development 
Group (CDC) established in 2010.  This is a collective body of stakeholders from the local 
institutions (the BCC, the NSCC and Lucid-eon), and district ceramic manufacturers (both 
large and small), which meets regularly and acts as the focal point for discussing district issues 
and co-ordinating responses to industry challenges (including EU and government policy 
directives). It has also become a forum for co-ordinating and managing collaborative bids for 
district wide funding relating to skills development, energy efficiency, and marketing.  Across 
the industrys sub-sectors, local actors have also sought to lead the district onto a new higher 
growth trajectory. Thus in Table and Giftware, leading district firms  supported by local 
institutions (including the NCC and BCC)  are positioning the sector into more niche, higher-
value added markets, which are less prone to low-cost competition. In technical ceramics, both 
Lucid-eon and a number of district firms have led on building cross-sectoral linkages at 
regional, national, and international levels, whereby specialist ceramics technologies are now 
being utilised in sectors ranging from biomaterials, medical appliances, communications to 
automotive (Tomlinson and Branston, 2014).      
The BJQ has also established new governance structures through the Jewellery Quarter 
Development Trust (JQDT), a community interest company created in 2011, and  like the 
CDC  it brings together representatives from a number of district stakeholders, including the 
Jewellery Quarter Association (JQA), the Jewellery Quarter Neighbourhood Forum (JQNF), 
the Jewellery Quarter Marketing Initiative (JQMI), the Birmingham Assay Office, the School 
of Jewellery, and Birmingham City Council (BCC). The JQDT is managed by a Board of 
(unpaid) Directors from these stakeholder groups, and carries out a range of activities for the 
benefit of all who live, work, learn within, invest in and visit the area, providing a vehicle for 
leadership and governance within the district7. The JDQTs main initiatives has been  
following a (positive) local referendum of district firms - to attain (for the BJQ) Business 
Improvement District (BID) status in 20128. This has allowed the BJQ to impose a 2% levy on 
all district firms, so as to fund a number of projects to renew the districts appeal, to make it 
more attractive for new investment and to encourage greater footfall for the districts retail and 
7 See http://www.jewelleryquarter.net/jqdt/ 
8 See https://www.gov.uk/guidance/business-improvement-districts
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leisure attractions9. Compared to North Staffordshire, many of the issues in the BJQ have been 
quintessentially local. A long standing and salient issue has been the use of urban space 
especially with regards to whether the BJQ should continue preserve the (remains) of the 
industry or to allow vacant buildings to be utilised for residential development (De Propris and 
Wei, 2007).  As (post-industrial) cities and districts seek to re-draw their urban spaces, there is 
often a delicate balance between matching the interests of industry, residents and tourism, and 
as important stakeholders, district firms themselves have an inherent interest in shaping such 
matters. In this regard, the JQDT has begun to facilitate wider engagement and deliberation in 
shaping district wide strategy and the future development of the BJQ10.  
Despite these initiatives, there remains much apathy in both districts with regards to policy and 
the ability to shape district trajectories (see Figure (1)). Apathy reduces democratic engagement 
in the local governance process, which - more broadly  could hamper attempts to encourage 
local determination. If firms are to play a greater role in local development, then it is clear 
(local) business associations remain the main channels of influence. Historically, in the UK, 
these associations have been regarded as the preserve of large(r) firms, with the voices of 
smaller firms not always being heard (Raco, 2003). Nevertheless, the results above suggest 
they can be a vehicle for facilitating new dyads between (local) actors, enhancing social capital, 
encouraging participation in local initiatives, and promoting wider deliberation (and coalition 
building) over local strategies, which may militate against the impact of (large) firm size (over 
district wide strategies). This scenario may require business associations to reach out to wider 
voices by moving towards more inclusive and heterarchical structures to enhance 
participation. In existing hierarchical structures, there may be some scope for UK business 
associations to do so by seeking to incorporate wider (disparate) interests, although in building 
new coalitions, some caution will no doubt be exercised so as not to dilute the associations 
overall efficacy in influencing state interlocutors and policy.    
9 Examples include securing new investment in public facilities such as redeveloping Caroline Street, improved 
street lighting, cleaning and revamping derelict buildings, promoting public artwork (in the BJQ) and other 
measures to enhance the BJQs aesthetic appeal (for further details, see http://jewelleryquarter.net/jqbid/ ).   
10 The BJQ is increasingly a residential locality as reflected in the composition of the JQDT which includes those 
who live and/or invest in the locality alongside more traditional actors.  Discussions with industry representatives 
revealed these changes in the urban environment had generated inevitable tensions reflecting different priorities 
among a range of actors over a variety of issues (e.g. parking, traffic flows, availability of business premises, 
desirability of tourism). Nevertheless, inclusive governance structures facilitate discourse over points of tension, 
thereby facilitating acceptable compromises, while also contributing to the advancement of points of common 
interest (e.g. district renovation, road improvements, district vibrancy).  
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6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have sought to develop the conceptual links between local governance systems 
and the ability of local firms to shape local development in the context of the industrial district. 
These links were then explored empirically utilising a unique primary dataset of 175 firms from 
two traditional British industrial districts; specifically, we examined the extent to which local 
firms exert influence over local industry initiatives and also the factors which determine the 
degree of influence.  While both districts exhibited a degree of apathy in relation to local 
development issues, we nevertheless found the traditional characteristics of the associational 
economy such as social capital and local networking, as being particularly important for 
facilitating local democratic engagement, with local business associations being principal 
spheres of influence. Such associations are conduits for local engagement, with active members 
often able to exert influence over district wide-policy initiatives. Given both British districts 
have previously been hindered by weak local governance structures, widening and encouraging 
access to these conduits (and associated networks) would offer all district firms more 
opportunities to shape local industrial development paths.   
These conclusions will hold resonance with scholars of industrial districts and local production 
systems, especially those in the Italian tradition. However, the British narrative presented in 
this paper is not only novel but also pertinent in the current UK policy climate and the 
revitalisation of regionally based industries. Indeed, in the dialogue emerging there now 
appears to be a focus on the private sectors role in devolution, local governance processes and 
local socio-economic determination (see Bailey et al., 2016). Local governance structures 
which facilitate a wide engagement of key stakeholders and collective actions can allow an 
organic and democratic form of place-renewing leadership to emerge. Such leadership puts 
regions in a stronger position to identify future challenges relevant to local industries, and thus 
plan and prioritise resources to meet these challenges accordingly. There is evidence of this 
emerging in both our cases where through joint actions, firms are collectively shaping, 
renewing and transforming manufacturing activities within their districts. More broadly, such 
activities and local governance processes are relevant in the wider context of the UKs 
governments recent desire to pursue place-based industrial strategies to rebalance the 
economy; local actors will be key in delivering this agenda and ensuring any policy support is 
tailored to (local) industry challenges (HMG, 2017).   
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Finally, we should note some limitations of the study, which provide some tentative 
suggestions for future research. First, the results relate to a relatively short time interval (5 
years), with a specific focus on the dependent variable; the degree of influence exerted over 
(local) policy initiatives. It can, of course, take years to formulate, deliberate upon, shape, and 
implement policy. The analysis captures a fixed snapshot of local firm influence in this 
process. It is highly likely the dynamics of relationships and the degree of influence (over 
policy) will change over time, especially as new firms enter/exit the sectors and new (industry) 
issues become in vogue (which may impact upon firms (and sub-sectors) differently). Further 
work might therefore seek to capture more of the dynamics in local policy determination 
processes, possibly through a longitudinal study. Secondly, the empirical analysis is drawn 
from the perspective of the firms in the study and, in addition to the aforementioned limitation 
in terms of reliance on managerial recall and sense-making, it would be useful in future work 
to align such data with insights from other stakeholders such as local policy-makers and trade 
unions in the process. This lends itself to a more qualitative approach. Finally, it is important 
to remember the results are specific to the two cases. Both are traditional Marshallian industrial 
districts, which have faced significant challenges in recent years, and where much apathy 
towards new re-generation initiatives remains.  The results should be seen in this context, and 
a degree of care should be taken in drawing generic conclusions.  
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Figure 1 
Table 1: Firm Influence in Industrial District Issues 
Issues Norther Staffordshire Ceramics Birmingham Jewellery Quarter
Development of Skill training provision Ceramics skills academy
New training and skills courses at 
educational establishments  
Jewellery Skills Apprenticeship 
Programme
Industry peer mentoring schemes 
Technological Development Lucideon investments in new kiln 
technologies 
Longton ‘Hothouse’ project 
Application for an Applied Materials 
Research and Innovation Centre under 
a city deal. 
Technology strategy board, including 
knowledge transfer networks 
Initiatives to develop 3D printing 
processes facilitated by the School of 
Jewellery 
Industry and/or Locality Marketing Development and protection of ‘Made 
in England’ back stamps. 
British Ceramics Biennial 
Initiatives to market the Jewellery 
Quarter as a destination 
Made in Britain drive and associated 
assaye mark 
Locality Development Development of Enterprise centres 
Local presence on industry bodies such 
as the British Ceramics Confederation. 
Ceramic Development Group  
Involvement in the EU-funded project: 
The Urban Network for Innovation in 
Ceramic Cities 
Jewellery Quarter Development Trust  
Business Improvement District 
Local presence on relevant industry 
bodies like British Jewellers Association 
Table 2: Ordered Probit: Dependent Variable – Degree of Influence in District Strategy
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Firm Age 0.002 (0.002) 0.001 (0.002) 0.001 (0.002) 0.002 (0.002)
Firm Size
100 + employees (Cat 3) 
10-99 employees (Cat 2) 
0.873 (0.308)*** 
0.382 (0.202)* 
0.391 (0.332) 
0.022 (0.218) 
0.503 (0.336) 
0.088 (0.220) 
0.487 (0.342) 
0.131 (0.222) 
North Staffs District  0.267 (0.167) 0.292 (0.171) 0.263 (0.176) 0.270 (0.179) 
Business Associations
Business Association Active Member (Cat 3) 
Business Association Member (Cat 2)  
0.880 (0.247)*** 
0.417 (0.193)** 
0.546 (0.259)** 
0.179 (0.202) 
0.707 (0.264)*** 
0.235 (0.205) 
Support from Business Institutions 
0.206 (0.1)** 0.192 (0.103)** 0.124 (0.106)
Participation in Development Initiatives 
Approached and Encouraged (Cat 3) 
Approached (Cat 2) 
0.462 (0.209)** 
-0.136 (0.216) 
0.445 (0.212)** 
-0.092 (0.219) 
Interest in District development initiatives
Frequent interest (Cat 3) 
Occasional Interest (Cat 2) 
0.829 (0.219)*** 
0.410 (0.219)** 
0.782 (0.221)*** 
0.495 (0.221)** 
Shared Values 0.203 (0.100)** 
District Ties
High and regular local engagement (Cat 3) 
Medium and occasional local engagement 
(Cat 2) 
0.738 (0.380)** 
0.173 (0.403) 
Threshold (Cut-off) points 
-0.504 (0.152)*** 
0.591(0.152)*** 
1.328 (0.169)*** 
1.625 (0.181)*** 
1.895 (0.191)*** 
2.354 (0.236)*** 
-0.342(0.192)* 
0.809(0.197)*** 
1.604 (0.214)*** 
1.935 (0.226)*** 
2.240(0.241)*** 
2.757 (0.283)*** 
-0.053(0.224) 
1.181(0.235)*** 
2.045 (0.258)*** 
2.419 (0.272)*** 
2.773 (0.289)*** 
3.358 (0.334)*** 
0.612 (0.430) 
1.912 (0.445)*** 
2.816 (0.464)*** 
3.215 (0.474)*** 
3.589 (0.487)*** 
4.218 (0.520)***
Nagelkerke 0.121 0.225 0.345 0.409 
Cox and Snell 0.116 0.216 0.331 0.393 
- 2 log likelihood (Intercept Only) 517.376 560.353 562.550 563.936 
- 2 log likelihood (Final) 495.743 517.724 492.261 476.671 
Chi-square χ2 21.632 (4.df)*** 42.629 (7 df)*** 70.289*** (11 df) 87.266***(14 df) 
Table 3: Ordered Probit: Dependent Variable – Degree of Influence in District Strategy
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Firm Age 
0.002 (0.002) 0.003 (0.002) 0.003 (0.002) 0.003 (0.002)
Firm Size
100 + employees (Cat 3) 
10-99 employees (Cat 2) 
0.137 (0.339) 
-0.50 (0.223) 
-0.012 (0.344) 
-0.083 (0.225) 
-0.092 (0.348) 
-0.083 (0.225) 
-0.228 (0.351) 
-0.104 (0.226) 
North Staffs District  0.111 (0.18) 0.045 (0.182) 0.047 (0.185) 0.137 (0.188) 
Business Associations
Business Association Active Member (Cat 3) 
Business Association Member (Cat 2)  
1.166 (0.249)*** 
0.503 (0.199)** 
1.086 (0.252)*** 
0.500 (0.204)** 
1.127 (0.258)*** 
0.531 (0.205)** 
0.985 (0.264)*** 
0.546 (0.206)** 
Shared Values 
0.272 (0.098) *** 0.212 (0.100)** 0.203 (0.100)** 0.169 (0.101)*
District Ties
High and regular local engagement (Cat 3) 
Medium and occasional local engagement 
(Cat 2) 
0.480 (0.379) 
0.026 (0.401) 
0.567 (0.381) 
0.057 (0.402) 
0.552 (0.381) 
0.071 (0.404) 
0.419 (0.384)  
-0.070 (0.407) 
Participation in Specific District Initiatives 
Collective marketing and Trade Fairs  
High participation (Cat 3) 
Medium participation (Cat 2)   
District wide R&D facilities and Training  
High participation (Cat 3) 
Medium participation (Cat 2)   
District Tourism  
High participation (Cat 3) 
Medium participation (Cat 2)   
Local Infrastructure  
High participation (Cat 3) 
Medium participation (Cat 2)   
0.789 (0.267)*** 
0.741 (0.201)*** 
0.474 (0.287)* 
0.484 (0.238)** 
0.909 (0.274)*** 
0.394 (0.250) 
0.422 (0.295) 
0.376 (0.247) 
0.813 (0.282)*** 
0.103 (0.292) 
0.424 (0.253)* 
0.623 (0.368)* 
0.392 (0.297) 
0.260 (0.253) 
0.691 (0.286)** 
0.122 (0.294) 
0.197 (0.272) 
0.103 (0.452) 
1.296 (0.390)*** 
0.690 (0.314) ** 
Threshold (Cut-off) points 0.272 (0.401)
1.570 (0.413)*** 
2.465 (0.429)*** 
2.825 (0.438)*** 
3.163 (0.449)*** 
3.743 (0.480)***
0.368 (0.401)
1.706 (0.414)*** 
2.647 (0.434)*** 
3.030(0.445)*** 
3.389 (0.457)*** 
3.986 (0.490)*** 
0.378 (0.402)
1.736 (0.415)*** 
2.695 (0.436)*** 
3.078 (0.447)*** 
3.438 (0.460)*** 
4.047 (0.493)*** 
0.300 (0.403)
1.701 (0.417)*** 
2.716 (0.441)*** 
3.132 (0.453)*** 
3.516 (0.467)*** 
4.149 (0.500)*** 
All Regressions include standard errors that are bootstrapped and clustered by firm. * indicates 
significance level (p-value) below 0.109, ** below 0.05 and **** below 0. 01
Nagelkerke 0.375 0.415 0.431 0.473 
Cox and Snell 0.360 0.399 0.414 0.455 
- 2 log likelihood (Intercept Only) 563.936 563.936 563.936 563.936 
- 2 log likelihood (Final) 485.951 474.894 470.531 457.842 
Chi-square χ2 77.986***(11 df) 89.043***(13 df) 93.406*** (15 df) 106.10*** (17 df)
Variables Appendix A: Survey Items and Variable Construction
Degree of Influence in District 
Strategic Issues 
Categorical 7 point Likert scale ranging from 
1 = No influence (we have no interest) to 7 = very high level of influence in the decision-making 
process. 
Firm Age Firm Age in Years
Firm Size Category 3; Firms with 100+ employees
Category 2: Firms with 10-99 employees 
Category 1 (Base); Firms with less than 10 employees 
District Affiliation Value = 1, if a firm is located within North Staffs district, 0 if located within BJQ
Business Association 
Membership 
Category 3; Firms which are active members of at least one business association
Category 2; Firms which are members of at least one business association 
Category 1 (Base); Firms which are not members of any business association  
Support from Business 
Institutions
Construct variable using the following survey items: 
i). Accessed and Received Industry Information 
ii). Accessed Business and Legal Advice 
iii). Accessed support in relation to collective marketing initiatives (trade fairs etc) 
iv). Accessed public R&D and training facilities 
v).  Accessed Technical Advice
vi). Accessed trade journals and industry newsletters  
Mean Score (across all 6 items):  2.67, s.d = 1.31  Cronbach’s alpha (α) = 0.93
(Survey items based upon Tomlinson (2012) and utilising a 7 point Likert Scale, with 1 = no 
benefit and 7 = high benefit) 
Participation in Development 
Initiatives  
Category 3; Firms which have been approached and encouraged to participate in local 
development initiatives  
Category 2; Firms which have been approached to participate in local development initiatives  
Category 1 (Base); Firms which have not been approached  to participate in local development 
initiatives  
(Based upon Sacchetti and Sugden. 2003) 
Interest in District 
development initiatives 
Category 3; Firms which have frequently expressed an interest in local development initiatives 
(at industry event or meeting)  
Category 2; Firms which have occasionally expressed an interest in local development initiatives 
(at industry event or meeting)  
Category 1 (Base);  Firms which have never expressed an interest in local development 
initiatives (at industry event or meeting)  
(Based upon Sachetti and Sugden, 2003) 
District Ties  Category 3; Firms which have high and regular engagement with other actors within the district
Category 2;  Firms which have occasional engagement with other  actors within the district 
Category 1 (Base); Firms which have little engagement with other actors within the district  
Shared Values  Construct variable using the following survey items: 
i). You and the people in your firm share the same ambitions and vision as other firms in the 
district 
ii). You consider your firm’s future is related to that of other firms in the district 
iiii). There is some kind of shared strategy or plan for the district] 
iv). People in your firm are encouraged and motivated to pursue the shared goals and strategy of 
the district  
Mean Score (across all 4 items): 3.95, s.d. = 1.21  Cronbach’s alpha (α) = 0.79
(Survey items based upon Tsai and Ghoshal (1998) and utilising a 7 point Likert Scale, with 1 = 
no benefit and 7 = high benefit) 
Participation in Specific 
District Initiatives  
a). Collective marketing and 
Trade Fairs  
b). District wide R&D facilities 
and Training  
c). District Tourism  
d). Local Infrastructure  
Category 3; Firms which have high level of participation in collective marketing initiatives  
Category 2; Firms which have a medium level of participation in in collective marketing 
initiatives  
Category 1 (Base);  Firms which do not participate in in collective marketing initiatives  
Category 3; Firms which have high level of participation in  R&D facilities and Training 
initiatives 
Category 2; Firms which have a medium level of participation  in  R&D facilities and Training 
initiatives 
Category 1 (Base);  Firms which do not participate in  in  R&D facilities and Training initiatives 
Category 3; Firms which have high level of participation in District tourism initiatives  
Category 2; Firms which have a medium level of participation  in District tourism initiatives  
Category 1 (Base);  Firms which do not participate in in District tourism initiatives  
Category 3; Firms which have high level of participation in local infrastructure initiatives  
Category 2; Firms which have a medium level of in local infrastructure initiatives  
Category 1 (Base);  Firms which do not participate in local infrastructure initiatives  
Appendix B: Survey responses as distributed by firm size 
Firm Level of Influence Firm Size (<10 
employees) 
Firm Size (10-99 
employees) 
Firm Size (100+ 
employees) 
1 (None) 27 6 2 
2 50 12 3 
3 18 17 6 
4 4 6 2 
5 5 1 2 
6 5 1 2 
7 (High) 1 2 3 
Business Association 
Membership  
Cat 1: Non-members 11 18 10
Cat 2: Members 45 19 6
Cat 3: Active Members 54 8 4
Participation in 
Development Initiatives  
Cat 1: Not Approached 32 17 7
Cat 2: Approached 24 11 5
Cat 3: Approached & 
Encouraged 
54 17 8
Interest in Development 
Initiatives
Cat 1:  Firms which have 
never expressed an 
interest in local 
development 
31 20 11
Cat 2:  Firms which have 
occasionally expressed an 
interest in local 
development 
42 10 3
Cat 3:  Firms which have 
frequently expressed an 
interest 
37 15 6
District Ties
Cat 1: Firms which have 
little engagement with 
other actors within the 
district 
81 30 14 
Cat 2:  Firms which have 
occasional engagement 
with other actors within 
the district 
22 14 4 
Cat 3: Firms which have 
high and regular 7 1 2 
Appendix C 
Marginal Effects (Model 1) 
Pr(Y=1) Pr(Y=2) Pr(Y=3) Pr(Y=4) Pr(Y=5) Pr(Y=6) Pr(Y=7)
Variable dy/dx dy/dx dy/dx dy/dx dy/dx dy/dx dy/dx
Firm Age -0.001 -0.0004 .0004 .0002 .0001 .0001 .00004
Firm Size
100 + employees (Cat 3) 
10-99 employees (Cat 2)
-0.085* 
-0.026 
 -0.107 
-0.024 
0.065** 
0.022 
0.045 
0.012 
0.035 
0.008 
0.034 
0.007 
0.014 
0.003 
North Staffs District -0.058 -0.048 0.046 0.024 0.0166 0.014 0.005
Business Associations
Business Association Active Member 
(Cat 3) 
Business Association Member (Cat 2)  
-0.124*** 
-0.050 
-0.152** 
-0.042 
0.091***
0.0397 
0.064** 
0.021 
0.051* 
0.015 
0.050* 
0.013 
0.021 
0.004 
Support from Business Institutions 
-0.027 -.0216 0.0216 0.011 0.008 0.006 0.002
Participation in Development Initiatives 
Approached and Encouraged (Cat 3) 
Approached (Cat 2) 
-0.089** 
0.021 
-0.086* 
0.015 
0.0696**
-0.016 
0.0401* 
-0.008 
0.029* 
-0.005 
0.026 
-0.005 
0.001 
-0.002 
Interest in District development 
initiatives 
Frequent interest (Cat 3) 
Occasional Interest (Cat 2) 
-0.151*** 
-0.097** 
-0.152*** 
-0.097** 
0.112***
0.076** 
0.069** 
0.045** 
0.052** 
0.033* 
0.049** 
0.029 
0.020 
0.011 
Shared Values -0.044** -0.035* 0.035* 0.0178* 0.0123* 0.010* 0.004
District Ties
High and regular local engagement (Cat 
3) 
Medium and occasional local 
engagement (Cat 2) 
-0.188* 
-0.036 
-0.083*** 
-0.032 
0.136* 
0.029 
0.058** 
0.0156 
0.037* 
0.011 
0.030** 
0.010 
0.010 
0.003 
engagement with other 
actors within the district 
Marginal Effects (Model 2) 
Pr(Y=1) Pr(Y=2) Pr(Y=3) Pr(Y=4) Pr(Y=5) Pr(Y=6) Pr(Y=7)
Variable dy/dx dy/dx dy/dx dy/dx dy/dx dy/dx dy/dx
Firm Age -.0005 -.0006 .00060 .0003 .0002 .0001 .00003
Firm Size
100 + employees (Cat 3) 
10-99 employees (Cat 2)
0.049
0.021 
0.038
0.020 
-0.048
-0.021 
-0.018
-0.009 
-0.011
-0.005 
-0.008
-0.004 
-0.002
-0.001 
North Staffs District -0.027 -0.027 0.0274 0.012 0.007 0.006 0.002
Business Associations
Business Association Active Member 
(Cat 3) 
Business Association Member (Cat 2)  
-0.140*** 
-0.010*** 
-0.237*** 
-0.113** 
0.128***
0.101** 
0.090***
0.048** 
0.068** 
0.031** 
0.065** 
0.025* 
0.027 
0.008 
Shared Values -0.033* -0.033 0.034* 0.014 0.009 0.007 0.002
District Ties
High and regular local engagement (Cat 
3) 
Medium and occasional local 
engagement (Cat 2) 
-0.0910 
 0.014 
-0.069 
0.0133 
0.088 
-0.014 
0.033 
-0.006 
0.020 
-0.004 
0.015 
-0.003 
0.004 
-0.001 
Participation in Specific District 
Initiatives  
Collective marketing and Trade Fairs  
High participation (Cat 3) 
Medium participation (Cat 2)   
District wide R&D facilities and Training 
High participation (Cat 3) 
Medium participation (Cat 2)   
District Tourism  
High participation (Cat 3) 
Medium participation (Cat 2)   
Local Infrastructure  
High participation (Cat 3) 
Medium participation (Cat 2)  
-0.064 
-0.048 
-0.102*** 
-0.023 
-0.036 
-0.020 
-0.122*** 
-0.109** 
-0.090 
-0.054 
-0.168** 
-0.025 
-0.042 
-0.021 
-0.332*** 
-0.161** 
0.068 
0.050 
0.102***
0.024 
0.037 
0.020 
0.051 
0.110***
0.036 
0.023 
0.064** 
0.011 
0.018 
0.009 
0.107***
0.063* 
0.024 
0.015 
0.047* 
0.007 
0.011 
0.006 
0.102** 
0.044* 
0.02 
0.011 
0.042 
0.005 
0.009 
0.005 
0.122** 
0.038 
0.007 
0.004 
0.016 
0.002 
0.003 
0.001 
0.074 
0.014 
